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chore(deps): update dependency hono to v4.12.14 [security]#46

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chore(deps): update dependency hono to v4.12.14 [security]#46
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renovate/npm-hono-vulnerability

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@renovate renovate Bot commented Feb 20, 2026 •
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This PR body was truncated due to platform limits.

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
hono (source) 4.11.7 → 4.12.14 age confidence

Hono added timing comparison hardening in basicAuth and bearerAuth

GHSA-gq3j-xvxp-8hrf

More information

Details

Summary

The basicAuth and bearerAuth middlewares previously used a comparison that was not fully timing-safe.

The timingSafeEqual function used normal string equality (===) when comparing hash values. This comparison may stop early if values differ, which can theoretically cause small timing differences.

The implementation has been updated to use a safer comparison method.

Details

The issue was caused by the use of normal string equality (===) when comparing hash values inside the timingSafeEqual function.

In JavaScript, string comparison may stop as soon as a difference is found. This means the comparison time can slightly vary depending on how many characters match.

Under very specific and controlled conditions, this behavior could theoretically allow timing-based analysis.

The implementation has been updated to:

  • Avoid early termination during comparison
  • Use a constant-time-style comparison method
Impact

This issue is unlikely to be exploited in normal environments.

It may only be relevant in highly controlled situations where precise timing measurements are possible.

This change is considered a security hardening improvement. Users are encouraged to upgrade to the latest version.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 3.7 / 10 (Low)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Hono vulnerable to arbitrary file access via serveStatic vulnerability

CVE-2026-29045 / GHSA-q5qw-h33p-qvwr

More information

Details

Summary

When using serveStatic together with route-based middleware protections (e.g. app.use('/admin/*', ...)), inconsistent URL decoding allowed protected static resources to be accessed without authorization.

The router used decodeURI, while serveStatic used decodeURIComponent. This mismatch allowed paths containing encoded slashes (%2F) to bypass middleware protections while still resolving to the intended filesystem path.

Details

The routing layer preserved %2F as a literal string, while serveStatic decoded it into / before resolving the file path.

Example:

Request: /admin%2Fsecret.html

  • Router sees: /admin%2Fsecret.html → does not match /admin/*
  • Static handler resolves: /admin/secret.html

As a result, static files under the configured static root could be served without triggering route-based protections.

This only affects applications that both:

  • Protect subpaths using route-based middleware, and
  • Serve files from the same static root using serveStatic.

This does not allow access outside the static root and is not a path traversal vulnerability.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker could bypass route-based authorization for protected static resources by supplying paths containing encoded slashes.

Applications relying solely on route-based middleware to protect static subpaths may have exposed those resources.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Hono Vulnerable to SSE Control Field Injection via CR/LF in writeSSE()

CVE-2026-29085 / GHSA-p6xx-57qc-3wxr

More information

Details

Summary

When using streamSSE() in Streaming Helper, the event, id, and retry fields were not validated for carriage return (\r) or newline (\n) characters.

Because the SSE protocol uses line breaks as field delimiters, this could allow injection of additional SSE fields within the same event frame if untrusted input was passed into these fields.

Details

The SSE helper builds event frames by joining lines with \n. While multi-line data: fields are handled according to the SSE specification, the event, id, and retry fields previously allowed raw values without rejecting embedded CR/LF characters.

Including CR/LF in these control fields could allow unintended additional fields (such as data:, id:, or retry:) to be injected into the event stream.

The issue has been fixed by rejecting CR/LF characters in these fields.

Impact

An attacker could manipulate the structure of SSE event frames if an application passed user-controlled input directly into event, id, or retry.

Depending on application behavior, this could result in injected SSE fields or altered event stream handling. Applications that render e.data in an unsafe manner (for example, using innerHTML) could potentially expose themselves to client-side script injection.

This issue affects applications that rely on the SSE helper to enforce protocol-level constraints.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Hono Vulnerable to Cookie Attribute Injection via Unsanitized domain and path in setCookie()

CVE-2026-29086 / GHSA-5pq2-9x2x-5p6w

More information

Details

Summary

The setCookie() utility did not validate semicolons (;), carriage returns (\r), or newline characters (\n) in the domain and path options when constructing the Set-Cookie header.

Because cookie attributes are delimited by semicolons, this could allow injection of additional cookie attributes if untrusted input was passed into these fields.

Details

setCookie() builds the Set-Cookie header by concatenating option values. While the cookie value itself is URL-encoded, the domain and path options were previously interpolated without rejecting unsafe characters.

Including ;, \r, or \n in these fields could result in unintended additional attributes (such as SameSite, Secure, Domain, or Path) being appended to the cookie header.

Modern runtimes prevent full header injection via CRLF, so this issue is limited to attribute-level manipulation within a single Set-Cookie header.

The issue has been fixed by rejecting these characters in the domain and path options.

Impact

An attacker may be able to manipulate cookie attributes if an application passes user-controlled input directly into the domain or path options of setCookie().

This could affect cookie scoping or security attributes depending on browser behavior. Exploitation requires application-level misuse of cookie options.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.4 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Hono vulnerable to Prototype Pollution possible through proto key allowed in parseBody({ dot: true })

GHSA-v8w9-8mx6-g223

More information

Details

Summary

When using parseBody({ dot: true }) in HonoRequest, specially crafted form field names such as __proto__.x could create objects containing a __proto__ property.

If the parsed result is later merged into regular JavaScript objects using unsafe merge patterns, this may lead to prototype pollution in the target object.

Details

The parseBody({ dot: true }) feature supports dot notation to construct nested objects from form field names.

In previous versions, the __proto__ path segment was not filtered. As a result, specially crafted keys such as __proto__.x could produce objects containing __proto__ properties.

While this behavior does not directly modify Object.prototype within Hono itself, it may become exploitable if the parsed result is later merged into regular JavaScript objects using unsafe merge patterns.

Impact

Applications that merge parsed form data into regular objects using unsafe patterns (for example recursive deep merge utilities) may become vulnerable to prototype pollution.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 4.8 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Hono: Path traversal in toSSG() allows writing files outside the output directory

CVE-2026-39408 / GHSA-xf4j-xp2r-rqqx

More information

Details

Summary

A path traversal issue in toSSG() allows files to be written outside the configured output directory during static site generation. When using dynamic route parameters via ssgParams, specially crafted values can cause generated file paths to escape the intended output directory.

Details

The static site generation process creates output files based on route paths derived from application routes and parameters. When ssgParams is used to provide values for dynamic routes, those values are used to construct output file paths. If these values contain traversal sequences (e.g. ..), the resulting output path may resolve outside the configured output directory. As a result, files may be written to unintended locations instead of being confined within the specified output directory.

For example:

import { Hono } from 'hono'
import { toSSG, ssgParams } from 'hono/ssg'

const app = new Hono()

app.get('/:id', ssgParams([{ id: '../pwned' }]), (c) => {
  return c.text('pwned')
})

toSSG(app, fs, { dir: './static' })

In this case, the generated output path may resolve outside ./static, resulting in a file being written outside the intended output directory.

Impact

An attacker who can influence values passed to ssgParams during the build process may be able to write files outside the intended output directory.

Depending on the build and deployment environment, this may:

  • overwrite unintended files
  • affect generated artifacts
  • impact deployment outputs or downstream tooling

This issue is limited to build-time static site generation and does not affect request-time routing.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.9 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Hono: Middleware bypass via repeated slashes in serveStatic

CVE-2026-39407 / GHSA-wmmm-f939-6g9c

More information

Details

Summary

A path handling inconsistency in serveStatic allows protected static files to be accessed by using repeated slashes (//) in the request path.

When route-based middleware (e.g., /admin/*) is used for authorization, the router may not match paths containing repeated slashes, while serveStatic resolves them as normalized paths. This can lead to a middleware bypass.

Details

The routing layer and serveStatic handle repeated slashes differently.

For example:

/admin/secret.txt => matches /admin/*
/admin//secret.txt => may not match /admin/*

However, serveStatic may interpret both paths as the same file location (e.g., admin/secret.txt) and return the file.

This inconsistency allows a request such as:

GET //admin/secret.txt

to bypass middleware registered on /admin/* and access protected files.

The issue has been fixed by rejecting paths that contain repeated slashes, ensuring consistent behavior between route matching and static file resolution.

Impact

An attacker can access static files that are intended to be protected by route-based middleware by using repeated slashes in the request path.

This can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive files under the static root.

This issue affects applications that rely on serveStatic together with route-based middleware for access control.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Hono has incorrect IP matching in ipRestriction() for IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses

CVE-2026-39409 / GHSA-xpcf-pg52-r92g

More information

Details

Summary

ipRestriction() does not canonicalize IPv4-mapped IPv6 client addresses (e.g. ::ffff:127.0.0.1) before applying IPv4 allow or deny rules. In environments such as Node.js dual-stack, this can cause IPv4 rules to fail to match, leading to unintended authorization behavior.

Details

The middleware classifies client addresses based on their textual form. Addresses containing ":" are treated as IPv6, including IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses such as ::ffff:127.0.0.1. These addresses are not normalized to IPv4 before matching.

As a result:

  • IPv4 static rules (e.g. 127.0.0.1) do not match because the raw string differs
  • IPv4 CIDR rules (e.g. 127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8) are skipped because the address is treated as IPv6

For example, with:

denyList: ['127.0.0.1']

a request from 127.0.0.1 may be represented as ::ffff:127.0.0.1 and bypass the deny rule.

This behavior commonly occurs in Node.js environments where IPv4 clients are exposed as IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses.

Impact

Applications that rely on IPv4-based ipRestriction() rules may incorrectly allow or deny requests.

In affected deployments, a denied IPv4 client may bypass access restrictions. Conversely, legitimate clients may be rejected when using IPv4 allow lists.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Hono missing validation of cookie name on write path in setCookie()

GHSA-26pp-8wgv-hjvm

More information

Details

Summary

Cookie names are not validated on the write path when using setCookie(), serialize(), or serializeSigned() to generate Set-Cookie headers.

While certain cookie attributes such as domain and path are validated, the cookie name itself may contain invalid characters.

This results in inconsistent handling of cookie names between parsing (read path) and serialization (write path).

Details

When applications use setCookie(), serialize(), or serializeSigned() with a user-controlled cookie name, invalid values (e.g., containing control characters such as \r or \n) can be used to construct malformed Set-Cookie header values.

For example:

Set-Cookie: legit
X-Injected: evil=value

However, in modern runtimes such as Node.js and Cloudflare Workers, such invalid header values are rejected and result in a runtime error before the response is sent.

As a result, the reported header injection / response splitting behavior could not be reproduced in these environments.

Impact

Applications that pass untrusted input as the cookie name to setCookie(), serialize(), or serializeSigned() may encounter runtime errors due to invalid header values.

In tested environments, malformed Set-Cookie headers are rejected before being sent, and the reported header injection behavior could not be reproduced.

This issue primarily affects correctness and robustness rather than introducing a confirmed exploitable vulnerability.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Hono: Non-breaking space prefix bypass in cookie name handling in getCookie()

CVE-2026-39410 / GHSA-r5rp-j6wh-rvv4

More information

Details

Summary

A discrepancy between browser cookie parsing and parse() handling allows cookie prefix protections to be bypassed.

Cookie names that are treated as distinct by the browser may be normalized to the same key by parse(), allowing attacker-controlled cookies to override legitimate ones.

Details

Browsers follow RFC 6265bis and only trim SP (0x20) and HTAB (0x09) from cookie names. Other characters, such as the non-breaking space (U+00A0), are preserved as part of the cookie name.

For example, the browser treats the following cookies as distinct:

"dummy-cookie"
"\u00a0dummy-cookie"

However, parse() previously used JavaScript's trim(), which removes a broader set of characters including U+00A0. As a result, both names are normalized to:

"dummy-cookie"

This mismatch allows attacker-controlled cookies with a U+00A0 prefix to shadow or override legitimate cookies when accessed via getCookie().

Impact

An attacker who can set cookies (e.g., via a man-in-the-middle on a non-secure page or other injection vector) can bypass cookie prefix protections and override sensitive cookies.

This may lead to:

  • Bypassing __Secure- and __Host- prefix protections
  • Overriding cookies that rely on the Secure attribute
  • Session fixation or session hijacking depending on application usage

This issue affects applications that rely on getCookie() for security-sensitive cookie handling.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 4.8 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

hono Improperly Handles JSX Attribute Names Allows HTML Injection in hono/jsx SSR

GHSA-458j-xx4x-4375

More information

Details

Summary

Improper handling of JSX attribute names in hono/jsx allows malformed attribute keys to corrupt the generated HTML output.

When untrusted input is used as attribute keys during server-side rendering, specially crafted keys can break out of attribute or tag boundaries and inject unintended HTML.

Details

When rendering JSX elements to HTML strings, attribute values are escaped, but attribute names (keys) were previously inserted into the output without validation.

If an attribute name contains characters such as ", >, or whitespace, it can alter the structure of the generated HTML.

For example, malformed attribute names can:

  • Break out of the current attribute and introduce unintended additional attributes
  • Break out of the current HTML tag and inject new elements into the output

This issue arises when untrusted input (such as query parameters or form data) is used as JSX attribute keys during server-side rendering.

Impact

An attacker who can control attribute keys used in JSX rendering may inject unintended attributes or HTML elements into the generated output.

This may lead to:

  • Injection of unexpected HTML attributes
  • Corruption of the HTML structure
  • Potential cross-site scripting (XSS) if combined with unsafe usage patterns

This issue affects applications that pass untrusted input as JSX attribute keys during server-side rendering.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 4.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Hono added timing comparison hardening in basicAuth and bearerAuth

GHSA-gq3j-xvxp-8hrf

More information

Details

Summary

The basicAuth and bearerAuth middlewares previously used a comparison that was not fully timing-safe.

The timingSafeEqual function used normal string equality (===) when comparing hash values. This comparison may stop early if values differ, which can theoretically cause small timing differences.

The implementation has been updated to use a safer comparison method.

Details

The issue was caused by the use of normal string equality (===) when comparing hash values inside the timingSafeEqual function.

In JavaScript, string comparison may stop as soon as a difference is found. This means the comparison time can slightly vary depending on how many characters match.

Under very specific and controlled conditions, this behavior could theoretically allow timing-based analysis.

The implementation has been updated to:

  • Avoid early termination during comparison
  • Use a constant-time-style comparison method
Impact

This issue is unlikely to be exploited in normal environments.

It may only be relevant in highly controlled situations where precise timing measurements are possible.

This change is considered a security hardening improvement. Users are encouraged to upgrade to the latest version.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 3.7 / 10 (Low)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Hono Vulnerable to Cookie Attribute Injection via Unsanitized domain and path in setCookie()

CVE-2026-29086 / GHSA-5pq2-9x2x-5p6w

More information

Details

Summary

The setCookie() utility did not validate semicolons (;), carriage returns (\r), or newline characters (\n) in the domain and path options when constructing the Set-Cookie header.

Because cookie attributes are delimited by semicolons, this could allow injection of additional cookie attributes if untrusted input was passed into these fields.

Details

setCookie() builds the Set-Cookie header by concatenating option values. While the cookie value itself is URL-encoded, the domain and path options were previously interpolated without rejecting unsafe characters.

Including ;, \r, or \n in these fields could result in unintended additional attributes (such as SameSite, Secure, Domain, or Path) being appended to the cookie header.

Modern runtimes prevent full header injection via CRLF, so this issue is limited to attribute-level manipulation within a single Set-Cookie header.

The issue has been fixed by rejecting these characters in the domain and path options.

Impact

An attacker may be able to manipulate cookie attributes if an application passes user-controlled input directly into the domain or path options of setCookie().

This could affect cookie scoping or security attributes depending on browser behavior. Exploitation requires application-level misuse of cookie options.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.4 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Hono Vulnerable to SSE Control Field Injection via CR/LF in writeSSE()

CVE-2026-29085 / GHSA-p6xx-57qc-3wxr

More information

Details

Summary

When using streamSSE() in Streaming Helper, the event, id, and retry fields were not validated for carriage return (\r) or newline (\n) characters.

Because the SSE protocol uses line breaks as field delimiters, this could allow injection of additional SSE fields within the same event frame if untrusted input was passed into these fields.

Details

The SSE helper builds event frames by joining lines with \n. While multi-line data: fields are handled according to the SSE specification, the event, id, and retry fields previously allowed raw values without rejecting embedded CR/LF characters.

Including CR/LF in these control fields could allow unintended additional fields (such as data:, id:, or retry:) to be injected into the event stream.

The issue has been fixed by rejecting CR/LF characters in these fields.

Impact

An attacker could manipulate the structure of SSE event frames if an application passed user-controlled input directly into event, id, or retry.

Depending on application behavior, this could result in injected SSE fields or altered event stream handling. Applications that render e.data in an unsafe manner (for example, using innerHTML) could potentially expose themselves to client-side script injection.

This issue affects applications that rely on the SSE helper to enforce protocol-level constraints.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Hono vulnerable to arbitrary file access via serveStatic vulnerability

CVE-2026-29045 / GHSA-q5qw-h33p-qvwr

More information

Details

Summary

When using serveStatic together with route-based middleware protections (e.g. app.use('/admin/*', ...)), inconsistent URL decoding allowed protected static resources to be accessed without authorization.

The router used decodeURI, while serveStatic used decodeURIComponent. This mismatch allowed paths containing encoded slashes (%2F) to bypass middleware protections while still resolving to the intended filesystem path.

Details

The routing layer preserved %2F as a literal string, while serveStatic decoded it into / before resolving the file path.

Example:

Request: /admin%2Fsecret.html

  • Router sees: /admin%2Fsecret.html → does not match /admin/*
  • Static handler resolves: /admin/secret.html

As a result, static files under the configured static root could be served without triggering route-based protections.

This only affects applications that both:

  • Protect subpaths using route-based middleware, and
  • Serve files from the same static root using serveStatic.

This does not allow access outside the static root and is not a path traversal vulnerability.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker could bypass route-based authorization for protected static resources by supplying paths containing encoded slashes.

Applications relying solely on route-based middleware to protect static subpaths may have exposed those resources.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Hono vulnerable to Prototype Pollution possible through proto key allowed in parseBody({ dot: true })

GHSA-v8w9-8mx6-g223

More information

Details

Summary

When using parseBody({ dot: true }) in HonoRequest, specially crafted form field names such as __proto__.x could create objects containing a __proto__ property.

If the parsed result is later merged into regular JavaScript objects using unsafe merge patterns, this may lead to prototype pollution in the target object.

Details

The parseBody({ dot: true }) feature supports dot notation to construct nested objects from form field names.

In previous versions, the __proto__ path segment was not filtered. As a result, specially crafted keys such as __proto__.x could produce objects containing __proto__ properties.

While this behavior does not directly modify Object.prototype within Hono itself, it may become exploitable if the parsed result is later merged into regular JavaScript objects using unsafe merge patterns.

Impact

Applications that merge parsed form data into regular objects using unsafe patterns (for example recursive deep merge utilities) may become vulnerable to prototype pollution.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 4.8 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Hono missing validation of cookie name on write path in setCookie()

GHSA-26pp-8wgv-hjvm

More information

Details

Summary

Cookie names are not validated on the write path when using setCookie(), serialize(), or serializeSigned() to generate Set-Cookie headers.

While certain cookie attributes such as domain and path are validated, the cookie name itself may contain invalid characters.

This results in inconsistent handling of cookie names between parsing (read path) and serialization (write path).

Details

When applications use setCookie(), serialize(), or serializeSigned() with a user-controlled cookie name, invalid values (e.g., containing control characters such as \r or \n) can be used to construct malformed Set-Cookie header values.

For example:

Set-Cookie: legit
X-Injected: evil=value

However, in modern runtimes such as Node.js and Cloudflare Workers, such invalid header values are rejected and result in a runtime error before the response is sent.

As a result, the reported header injection / response splitting behavior could not be reproduced in these environments.

Impact

Applications that pass untrusted input as the cookie name to setCookie(), serialize(), or serializeSigned() may encounter runtime errors due to invalid header values.

In tested environments, malformed Set-Cookie headers are rejected before being sent, and the reported header injection behavior could not be reproduced.

This issue primarily affects correctness and robustness rather than introducing a confirmed exploitable vulnerability.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Hono: Non-breaking space prefix bypass in cookie name handling in getCookie()

CVE-2026-39410 / GHSA-r5rp-j6wh-rvv4

More information

Details

Summary

A discrepancy between browser cookie parsing and parse() handling allows cookie prefix protections to be bypassed.

Cookie names that are treated as distinct by the browser may be normalized to the same key by parse(), allowing attacker-controlled cookies to override legitimate ones.

Details

Browsers follow RFC 6265bis and only trim SP (0x20) and HTAB (0x09) from cookie names. Other characters, such as the non-breaking space (U+00A0), are preserved as part of the cookie name.

For example, the browser treats the following cookies as distinct:

"dummy-cookie"
"\u00a0dummy-cookie"

However, parse() previously used JavaScript's trim(), which removes a broader set of characters including U+00A0. As a result, both names are normalized to:

"dummy-cookie"

This mismatch allows attacker-controlled cookies with a U+00A0 prefix to shadow or override legitimate cookies when accessed via getCookie().

Impact

An attacker who can set cookies (e.g., via a man-in-the-middle on a non-secure page or other injection vector) can bypass cookie prefix protections and override sensitive cookies.

This may lead to:

  • Bypassing __Secure- and __Host- prefix protections
  • Overriding cookies that rely on the Secure attribute
  • Session fixation or session hijacking depending on application usage

This issue affects applications that rely on getCookie() for security-sensitive cookie handling.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 4.8 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Hono: Middleware bypass via repeated slashes in serveStatic

CVE-2026-39407 / GHSA-wmmm-f939-6g9c

More information

Details

Summary

A path handling inconsistency in serveStatic allows protected static files to be accessed by using repeated slashes (//) in the request path.

When route-based middleware (e.g., /admin/*) is used for authorization, the router may not match paths containing repeated slashes, while serveStatic resolves them as normalized paths. This can lead to a middleware bypass.

Details

The routing layer and serveStatic handle repeated slashes differently.

For example:

/admin/secret.txt => matches /admin/*
/admin//secret.txt => may not match /admin/*

However, serveStatic may interpret both paths as the same file location (e.g., admin/secret.txt) and return the file.

This inconsistency allows a request such as:

GET //admin/secret.txt

to bypass middleware registered on /admin/* and access protected files.

The issue has been fixed by rejecting paths that contain repeated slashes, ensuring consistent behavior between route matching and static file resolution.

Impact

An attacker can access static files that are intended to be protected by route-based middleware by using repeated slashes in the request path.

This can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive files under the static root.

This issue affects applications that rely on serveStatic together with route-based middleware for access control.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Hono: Path traversal in toSSG() allows writing files outside the output directory

CVE-2026-39408 / GHSA-xf4j-xp2r-rqqx

More information

Details

Summary

A path traversal issue in toSSG() allows files to be written outside the configured output directory during static site generation. When using dynamic route parameters via ssgParams, specially crafted values can cause generated file paths to escape the intended output directory.

Details

The static site generation process creates output files based on route paths derived from application routes and parameters. When ssgParams is used to provide values for dynamic routes, those values are used to construct output file paths. If these values contain traversal sequences (e.g. ..), the resulting output path may resolve outside the configured output directory. As a result, files may be written to unintended locations instead of being confined within the specified output directory.

For example:

import { Hono } from 'hono'
import { toSSG, ssgParams } from 'hono/ssg'

const app = new Hono()

app.get('/:id', ssgParams([{ id: '../pwned' }]), (c) => {
  return c.text('pwned')
})

toSSG(app, fs, { dir: './static' })

In this case, the generated output path may resolve outside ./static, resulting in a file being written outside the intended output directory.

Impact

An attacker who can influence values passed to ssgParams during the build process may be able to write files outside the intended output directory.

Depending on the build and deployment environment, this may:

  • overwrite unintended files
  • affect generated artifacts
  • impact deployment outputs or downstream tooling

This issue is limited to build-time static site generation and does not affect request-time routing.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.9 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Hono has incorrect IP matching in ipRestriction() for IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses

CVE-2026-39409 / GHSA-xpcf-pg52-r92g

More information

Details

Summary

ipRestriction() does not canonicalize IPv4-mapped IPv6 client addresses (e.g. ::ffff:127.0.0.1) before applying IPv4 allow or deny rules. In environments such as Node.js dual-stack, this can cause IPv4 rules to fail to match, leading to unintended authorization behavior.

Details

The middleware classifies client addresses based on their textual form. Addresses containing ":" are treated as IPv6, including IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses such as ::ffff:127.0.0.1. These addresses are not normalized to IPv4 before matching.

As a result:

  • IPv4 static rules (e.g. 127.0.0.1) do not match because the raw string differs
  • IPv4 CIDR rules (e.g. 127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8) are skipped because the address is treated as IPv6

For example, with:

denyList: ['127.0.0.1']

a request from 127.0.0.1 may be represented as ::ffff:127.0.0.1 and bypass the deny rule.

This behavior commonly occurs in Node.js environments where IPv4 clients are exposed as IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses.

Impact

Applications that rely on IPv4-based ipRestriction() rules may incorrectly allow or deny requests.

In affected deployments, a denied IPv4 client may bypass access restrictions. Conversely, legitimate clients may be rejected when using IPv4 allow lists.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

hono Improperly Handles JSX Attribute Names Allows HTML Injection in hono/jsx SSR

GHSA-458j-xx4x-4375

More information

Details

Summary

Improper handling of JSX attribute names in hono/jsx allows malformed attribute keys to corrupt the generated HTML output.

When untrusted input is used as attribute keys during server-side rendering, specially crafted keys can break out of attribute or tag boundaries and inject unintended HTML.

Details

When rendering JSX elements to HTML strings, attribute values are escaped, but attribute names (keys) were previously inserted into the output without validation.

If an attribute name contains characters such as ", >, or whitespace, it can alter the structure of the generated HTML.

For example, malformed attribute names can:

  • Break out of the current attribute and introduce unintended additional attributes
  • Break out of the current HTML tag and inject new elements into the output

This issue arises when untrusted input (such as query parameters or form data) is used as JSX attribute keys during server-side rendering.

Impact

An attacker who can control attribute keys used in JSX rendering may inject unintended attributes or HTML elements into the generated output.

This may lead to:

  • Injection of unexpected HTML attributes
  • Corruption of the HTML structure
  • Potential cross-site scripting (XSS) if combined with unsafe usage patterns

This issue affects applications that pass untrusted input as JSX attribute keys during server-side rendering.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 4.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Release Notes

honojs/hono (hono)

v4.12.14

Compare Source

Security fixes

This release includes fixes for the following security issues:

Improper handling of JSX attribute names in hono/jsx SSR

Affects: hono/jsx. Fixes missing validation of JSX attribute names during server-side rendering, which could allow malformed attribute keys to corrupt the generated HTML output and inject unintended attributes or elements. GHSA-458j-xx4x-4375

Other changes

  • fix(aws-lambda): handle invalid header names in request processing (#​4883) fa2c74f

v4.12.13

[Compare Source](https://redirect.github.co

@renovate renovate Bot requested a review from luxass as a code owner February 20, 2026 20:39
@renovate renovate Bot added the security label Feb 20, 2026
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socket-security Bot commented Feb 20, 2026 •
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Review the following changes in direct dependencies. Learn more about Socket for GitHub.

Diff Package Supply Chain
Security		 Vulnerability Quality Maintenance License
Updatedhono@​4.11.7 ⏵ 4.12.1499 +1100 +3197 +196 +1100

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@renovate renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-hono-vulnerability branch from 5ad4d5d to 76994e3 Compare March 4, 2026 22:37
@renovate renovate Bot changed the title chore(deps): update dependency hono to v4.11.10 [security] chore(deps): update dependency hono to v4.12.4 [security] Mar 4, 2026
@renovate renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-hono-vulnerability branch from 76994e3 to 0449f54 Compare March 11, 2026 03:54
@renovate renovate Bot changed the title chore(deps): update dependency hono to v4.12.4 [security] chore(deps): update dependency hono to v4.12.7 [security] Mar 11, 2026
@renovate renovate Bot changed the title chore(deps): update dependency hono to v4.12.7 [security] chore(deps): update dependency hono to v4.12.12 [security] Apr 15, 2026
@renovate renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-hono-vulnerability branch from 0449f54 to 34567f5 Compare April 15, 2026 17:25
@renovate renovate Bot changed the title chore(deps): update dependency hono to v4.12.12 [security] chore(deps): update dependency hono to v4.12.14 [security] Apr 16, 2026
@renovate renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-hono-vulnerability branch from 34567f5 to 02a9d88 Compare April 16, 2026 10:50
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